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Abstract 
The centre-of-gravity of world‘s economic power is 
shifting eastwards to the ‗Indo-Pacific‘, a maritime-
configured macro-region that spans the maritime 
underbelly of Asia connecting the Indian and the western 
Pacific oceans. The security environment in the Indian 
Ocean and the western Pacific are different; nonetheless, 
strong maritime security linkages emerging between the 
two oceans has led to the reincarnation of the concept of 
‗Indo-Pacific‘. Since the turn of the 21st century, new 
maritime insecurities have taken root, including in terms 
of China‘s revisionist positions on the established 
maritime order. Notwithstanding the US response in the 
western Pacific and the recent articulation of its ‗Indo-
Pacific‘ strategy, it is unclear how the regional countries 
and the major regional stakeholders willmanage to 
address the emerging maritime insecurities in the Indian 
Ocean, including in terms of China‘s expanding politico-
military footprint. This paper attempts to examine  the 
security environment and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific 
in context of India‘s national security interests.  
Keywords: Indo-Pacific Geopolitics, PLA Navy, Chinese Strategy 
1. Introduction 
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Western Pacific rim represent 
the maritime space of the Afro-Asian macro-region that is being 
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increasingly referred to as the ‗Indo-Pacific‘ region. Since 2010, the 
concept of ‗Indo-Pacific‘ has gained prevalence in the geopolitical 
and strategic discourse, and is now being used increasingly by 
policy-makers, analysts and academics in Asia and beyond. It is 
now precisely a decade since the concept was proposed by 
Khurana in 2007. Although the Australians have been using the 
term ‗Indo-Pacific‘ earlier, it was for the first time, at least in recent 
decades, that the concept was formally introduced and explained in 
an academic paper (Khurana, 2007, 2019). 
1.1 Regional Security Environment  
In comparison to the rest of the world, the maritime-configured 
Indo-Pacific region is plagued more by insecurities. The nature and 
character of such insecurities across the Indo-Pacific region is not 
uniform. Even though there are some issues that involve the entire 
region, the predominant issues in the East China Sea and South 
China Sea, for example, are very different than those in the Western 
Indian Ocean, and in a sense, present contrasts and 
contradictions.Nonetheless, four aspects are distinct and germane 
to the understanding of the broader security environment in the 
Indo-Pacific region.  
The first pertains to the very concept of ―maritime security‖. Unlike 
in the developed West where the concept refers only to non-
traditional security threats, including those posed by non-state 
actors, for the countries of the Indo-Pacific region, traditional 
military challenges and issues of territorial sovereignty form a 
major part of the concept of ‗maritime security‘. Also, as 
characteristic of the maritime realm in general, there is a very hazy 
dividing line between non-traditional and traditional security 
issues, with overlaps between the two, or non-traditional threats 
reinforcing traditional military insecurities. Take, for instance, 
China‘s financial investment in Sri Lanka‘s Hambantota port 
project, which has lately turned into a ‗debt trap‘ for Colombo. 
While the financial leverage that Beijing wields against Colombo is 
a non-traditional security issue for Sri Lanka, the handling of the 
port‘s internal security by Chinese personnel and the enhanced 
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likelihood of PLA Navy‘s submarine activity off Hambantota have 
increased the level of traditional military threat to India.    
Secondly, in the IOR, many of the countries are economically 
underdeveloped with inadequate state capacity to regulate human 
activity even on their land territories; much less to ensure good 
order and human security in their extensive maritime zones and 
beyond. On the other hand, the Western Pacific rim countries are 
beset by insecurities that are more a result of traditional military 
threats due to territorial issues, and military imbalances, much of it 
a residue of history. In total, the Indo-Pacific countries are in 
nascent stages of evolution as nation-states vis-à-vis the West, 
either in terms of their economic power and state capacity or in 
terms of their territorial consolidation. 
Thirdly, even while some issues seem to be specific to either the 
Indian Ocean or Western Pacific Ocean, the linkage between the 
two areas has always existed. The sea-borne nuclear and missile 
proliferation network involving China, Pakistan and North Korea 
is case in point. Such links between the two areas are becoming 
increasingly strong and evident. This is one of the major reasons 
why the term ‗Indo-Pacific‘ has lately been added to the 
geopolitical lexicon of analysts.  
Fourthly, many extra-regional powers are major stakeholders in the 
region and therefore have continued to play a dominant security 
role in the Indo-Pacific region albeit to secure their own interests 
that may or may not be convergent with those of the regional 
countries.‖ Although the role of such extra-regional stakeholders is 
necessary for regional security and stability, paradoxically, it leads 
to concomitant insecurities and instability due to heightened 
rivalries, making the regional security environment geopolitics 
highly complex. 
1.2 Salient Maritime Security issues 
The maritime security issues like maritime terrorism and crimes, 
issues linked with maritime jurisdiction and sustainable 
exploitation of resources, issues concerning human safety, and so 
on, are well known, and so are their causes and much has been 
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written about these issues in detail. This paper, therefore, makes an 
attempt to examine select issues that have direct consequences on 
India and its regional neighbourhood. It also tries to extrapolate the 
maritime security challenges and trends into the medium-to-long 
term time frame. Although such extrapolation is based on an 
estimate and is very tentative, it could contribute much to enrich 
the current discourse and prepare the regional countries and other 
stakeholders for the future. For analytical convenience, this paper 
divides the Indo-Pacific region, into three distinct areas – the 
western Indian Ocean, the eastern Indian Ocean, and the western 
Pacific Ocean. 
1.3 Maritime Piracy  
Piracy in the western Indian Ocean made the period between 2005 
and 2012 rather tumultuous for all regional countries and 
stakeholders. The comprehensive counter-piracy response – 
ranging from UNSC‘s authorisations to multi-national naval 
missions and shipping community‘s Best Management Practices 
(BMP) –effectively dealt with the menace.  
However, legal issues have continued to pose a major challenge. 
Earlier, India was confronted with the legal voids to prosecute the 
pirates. This issue was never resolved, and India tided over it 
through transient politico-diplomatic arrangements. In addition, 
India is now saddled with additional legal complexities pertaining 
to the Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC), Vessel 
Protection Detachments (VPDs) and ‗floating armouries‘. So now it 
is an unenviable position of legal ambiguities, which are more 
complex than the situation we faced in 2005. Can the private sector 
take over the roles of states for providing security? Who would 
authorize rules of engagement for the private guards? Such practice 
establishes dangerous precedents in terms of the risk of inadvertent 
or accidental use of force. The case of MV Enrica Lexie (2012) is 
illustrative of the enhanced risks. Besides, the emergence of 
‗floating armories‘ within the maritime zones of coastal states not 
only conflicts with their domestic laws, but also endangers their 
security (Chatterjee, 2014).  The case of MV Seaman Guard Ohio 
(2013) is a case in point. The particular vessel may have been 
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operating for benign ends, but such practice may be used as a cover 
for arms trafficking, or even as depot ships for terrorists and other 
militants (Greenberg, 2006). 
In 2015, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), in 
conjunction with the shipping industry and the flag states 
promulgated ISO 28007-1:2015 guidelines to standardise the 
practice and regulate PMSCs. The regulations address the 
command relationship between the master and the Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP), Rules of 
Engagement (RoE) and questions of liability. However, many other 
legal issues such as the use of force against persons on board 
foreign-flagged ships and carriage of weapons in foreign territorial 
waters and ports (‗floating armouries‘) remain unaddressed. The 
‗bottom-line‘ remains that the practice of employing PMSCs on 
board merchant ships is not—and cannot be—circumscribed by 
any international law, given the existing Westphalian international 
order wherein only States—and State agencies—are given the legal 
right to use violent means. 
The pirate attacks off Somalia have subsided since 2013 due to 
effective countermeasures. But until instability and deprivation 
persist in the area, and the constraints of local maritime forces are 
addressed, there is a potential for piracy to resurface when the 
prevailing ‗deterrent-effect‘ wears off and the multinational naval 
forces withdraw from the area.  
1.4 Maritime Terrorism 
Until a half-decade ago, the Sea Tigers of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a Sri Lankan militant group well known 
for its resort to maritime terrorism. While it was wiped out in 2010, 
there is a high potential for this maritime threat to reappear in the 
western Indian Ocean in the form of religious radical ideology 
spilling-over into the sea. The militant group called the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seeks to create an Islamic state or 
caliphate. In August 2015, it claimed to have begun the usage of its 
own currency (The Statesman, 2015). For its economic sustenance, 
maritime access and communications would be essential for the 
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ISIS-governed state. For instance, the ISIS possesses expansive 
oilfields in northern Iraq, but this is of little use until it can export 
the oil. The ISIS may have plans to build a navy, but any nascent 
navy would need to resort to asymmetric means, similar to the Sea 
Tigers. In July 2015, a Sinai-based group affiliated to ISIS destroyed 
an Egyptian coast-guard ship using a missile (BBC News, 2015). 
This incident reinforces the budding capability of ISIS for ‗maritime 
jihad‘. Such an asymmetric naval force could pose a major threat to 
freedom of navigation. If the ISIS expands the territory under its 
control to have access to the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz 
would become highly insecure and vulnerable to being choked. If 
ISIS were to succeed, the movement could spill-over to Southeast 
Asia to revive the Jammah Islamiyah (JI) movement.  
The religious fundamentalist group Al Qaeda could also resort to 
‗maritime jihad‘. Although it disowned ISIS in February 2014 on 
the basis of political objectives, (The Washington Times, 2014) its 
radical ideology is similar to that of ISIS. The hijacking of Pakistani 
warship PNS Zulfiqar by Al Qaeda operatives in September 2014 
represents the empirical evidence of the same. Three days before 
the Zulfiqar incident, Al Qaeda had declared its intent to carry its 
‗jihad‘ to the Indian sub-continent. Evidently, the osmosis of such 
ideology to South Asia has already begun. News reportage 
emanating from the Maldives is highlighting the rise of radical 
Islam in the island country (Hamid, 2015). In September 2015, 
Bangladeshi intelligence authorities unearthed a plan of some 
Islamist groups to target naval bases and refineries in Chittagong 
(Times of India, 2015). Hence, radical ideology is seen to be moving 
eastwards towards India. This is leading to an added potential 
threat to Indian naval assets and infrastructure, besides the existing 
threat to the ‗softer‘ targets in India like offshore installations and 
ports. Given the ample evidence that the terrorists who attacked 
Mumbai in November 2008 were trained by the Pakistan Navy, the 
Indian security establishment cannot take these developments 
lightly.  
From the Indian perspective, this represents major insecurity. From 
the broader perspective too, the expansion of religious 
Gurpreet Singh Khurana                           Maritime Security and Geopolitics 
 
77 
 
fundamentalism eastwards is potentially dangerous since it could 
potentially engulf the entire IOR and even Southeast Asia, linking 
up with the JI movement that is currently dormant. 
While the capacity void of the regional countries poses a challenge 
to combat piracy, it is more relevant in the context of maritime 
terrorism. Most regional maritime forces could be overwhelmed by 
a motivated and well-equipped terrorist group, particularly when 
it resorts to asymmetric means. It may be recalled that in early-
2014, ISIS forces used anti-tank guided weapons to destroy five 
M1A1 Abrams tanks of the Iraqi army and shot down six of its 
helicopters using light anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers 
(Pianin, 2014). Very few countries in the western IOR possess 
adequate naval capability, even for force-protection, let alone 
undertaking dedicated counter-terrorism operations at sea. 
Purportedly, among the most relevant ones with the potential to 
contribute are Pakistan, India, and Iran.   
Pakistan — The Pakistan Navy is contributing to the US-led 
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Task Force-151‘s counter-piracy 
effort. However, its credibility to effectively contribute to counter 
maritime terrorism is doubtful, given the growing radicalisation of 
its military and its India-specific military strategy.  
India —  While New Delhi seeks to give effect to its normative role 
as a regional security provider, it may be compelled to focus its 
maritime-military capability to counter the emerging threats of 
proxy-war emanating from Pakistan – through (punitive) active 
deterrence, if required – rather than employ its forces in the 
regional context.    
Iran — In the past, Iran itself has issued threats to block the 
International Shipping Lane (ISL) transiting the Strait of Hormuz. 
Tehran‘s role in the conflict in Yemen, and its emerging 
confrontation with the US and the other Persian Gulf countries 
lends much ambiguity to its potential role to counter maritime 
terrorism. 
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This has led to the need to involve coalition forces led by extra-
regional stakeholders to ensure maritime security in the IOR, 
which has its own pitfalls (addressed later). 
1.5 The Capability Contrast 
The Indo-Pacific region is marked by contrasting naval capabilities. 
The eastern IOR and the Western Pacific are marked by a 
proliferation of sea-denial capabilities, particularly submarines. The 
table below indicatesthat in 15 years after 2010, the region would be 
adding close to a hundred submarines amounting to about one-
and-half times the current force levels (The data excludes obsolete 
and midget submarines that cannot be deployed beyond coastal 
waters).  
Country 2010 Beyond 2025 (Projected 
Estimates) 
South 
Africa 
3 (209-1400) 3  
Iran 3 (Kilo) 3 
Pakistan 5 (Agousta 70/90B) 11 (Agousta 90B/Chinese 
Yuan/AIP) 
India 16 (Kilo/209/ 
Foxtrot)  
18 (Kilo/209/ P-15 Scorpene) + 2 
SSN+ 2 SSBN 
Bangladesh - 2 (Chinese Ming) 
Thailand - 3 (Chinese Yuan) 
Myanmar - 1 (Indian Kilo) 
Indonesia 2 (Type 209) 5 (3 ROK-built 209/1200+ 2 Kilo) 
Malaysia 2 (Scorpene-class 
inducted in 2009) 
2 
Singapore 4 (Challenger/ 
Sjoorman)  
4 (2 Vastergotland + 2 Type 218) 
Vietnam - 6 (Kilo) 
China 30(Song/Yuan/Kilo) 
+ 2 SSN (093) + 3 
SSBN (094) 
54 (Song/Yuan/Kilo) + 7 SSN 
(093/ 095) + 6 SSBN (094/ 096) 
Taiwan 04 (Hai Lung/ 
Guppy II) 
12  
Japan 19 (Souryu/ 
Oyashio/Harushio) 
23 (additional  04 Soryu) 
ROK 12 (209-1200/ 214- 18 (214-KSS2/ KSS3) 
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KSS-2) 
Russia 20 (Lada/ Kilo) + 25 
SSN (Sierra/Oscar 
II/ Akula/ Victor 
III....) + 15 SSBN 
(Typhoon/ Delta/ 
Borey) 
22 (additional 2 Lada) + 27 SSN 
(additional 2 Yasen) + 19 SSBN 
(additional 4 Borey) 
Total 171 263 
Fig 1. The proliferation of Submarines in the Indo-Pacific (West to East) (Jane‘s Fighting 
Ships 2010-2011 et al.)  
It must be noted that this trend also stands in stark contrast to the 
rest of the world, wherewith the possible exceptions of a couple of 
countries in Latin America like Brazil and Venezuela – the 
submarine force-levels are not increasing.   
Understandably, such capability is meant for deterrence and cater 
for worst-case scenarios, and thus for reassurance and increasing 
the level of security. However, paradoxically, it is likely to lead to 
enhanced non-traditional insecurity at the regional level over 
various issues like water space management, de-confliction of 
unintentional encounters and response to submarine emergencies 
and rescue. Due to the sensitive nature of submarine operations, 
the regional countries are unlikely to be forthcoming to share 
information on their submarine movements and deployment areas, 
which adds to the complexity of the issue.   
2. Marine Resource Management  
While the countries in the eastern IOR and Western Pacific rim 
build high-end sea-denial capabilities, many of these – particularly 
in the western IOR lack the basic maritime capacity to enforce order 
in their extensive maritime zones, leading to unsustainable 
exploitation of resources, particularly overfishing, and degradation 
of their marine environment. 
2.1 Maritime Disputes  
Until less than a decade ago, the predominant maritime insecurity 
in the WP had the potential of a conflict over Taiwan and its 
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adverse implications on freedom of navigation (FON). Although 
the maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) andEast China 
Sea (ECS) were there, these were not in the focus. Today these 
disputes have not only taken centre-stage, but have become more 
complex, involving more countries and the extra-regional powers, 
notably the US. The scope of disputes has also increased in terms of 
the issues involved, which may have adverse ramifications for the 
regional countries and other stakeholders. These issues include:  
• Enlarged geographic/geopolitical scope 
• Freedom of navigation/over-flight versus Foreign Military 
Activity in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) 
• US-China military brinkmanship, including operational 
concepts such as China‘s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) 
versus the US Air-Sea Battle (ASB), which has now been 
rechristened as Joint Access and Manoeuvre in the Global 
Commons (GCJAM).  
• Access to resources based on tenets of international law 
• Upholding other norms of international law on: 
o Resolution of maritime claims 
o Dispute settlement 
Lately, the maritime disputes eastwards of India have usually been 
more ‗visible‘, either due to their intractable nature (in the Western 
Pacific rim) or due to the tangible progress made through 
international arbitrations (in the Bay of Bengal/Indonesia-
Philippines dispute settlement). The ones in India‘s west have been 
dormant; and hence, rarely come into the limelight. There are many 
such disputes that dot the western Indian Ocean stretching from 
the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to the areas around Madagascar and 
the Chaos Archipelago. Among these conflicts, there is one 
between India and Pakistan over Sir Creek and related maritime 
boundary delineation.  
The claimant countries are not asserting their claims militarily (in 
contrast to the littorals of the Western Pacific rim). Interestingly; the 
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dormancy of these disputes may be due to an exceptional positive 
spin-off of the lack of their maritime-military capacities.  
How and when will these be resolved? It is indeed difficult to 
arrive at a consensus regarding the number. The demonstrated will 
of countries in the Bay of Bengal - and some other Southeast Asian 
countries – to refer their maritime contentions to international 
tribunals may set positive precedents for the other countries. 
However, it is also possible that as they develop naval capabilities, 
the countries of the western Indian Ocean may tend to emulate the 
military assertion of the littorals in the western Pacific. This 
possibility bears the potential for a major instability in the area in 
the coming decades.  
2.3 Irregular Sea-borne Migration 
The eastern Indian Ocean is severely affected by the migrations of 
the Rohingyas from Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the Sri Lankan 
Tamils to the well-off countries of Southeast Asia and Australia. 
These migrations are not yet as serious as the migrations further 
west of the Indian Ocean, where asylum seekers from West Asia 
and northern Africa are crossing the Mediterranean Sea to throng 
the various camps in Europe. But if ISIS were to expand to 
Southeast Asia, this could become a big issue.  
Over the medium-to-long term timeframe, nature could be another 
cause for mass migrations. Climate-induced sea-level rise and 
natural disasters could lead to unprecedented mass emigration 
from low-lying countries in the area, particularly the island states. 
This could lead to major humanitarian crises, with strong regional 
and global ramifications.  
One aspect concerning mass migration is the voids or constraints of 
international law. The migrations in the eastern Indian Ocean are 
largely economic, and thus not covered by the legal provisions on 
the obligation of states to grant asylum. The dated ‗Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees‘ of 1951 (Refugee Convention, 
1951) and its 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 2010) cater only for political 
asylum-seekers, and not to those who are compelled to migrate due 
to economic deprivation and lack of opportunities to earn a 
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livelihood. It may also be necessary for international law to cater 
for contingencies involving a large-scale displacement of people 
forced by nature.    
2.4 Maritime Search and Rescue 
An attendant issue of maritime is Search and Rescue (SAR). In the 
predominantly maritime-configured Indo-Pacific region with 
increasing traffic – both by sea and air – the aspect of SAR is a 
stand-alone problem as well. The series of recent accidents like the 
disappearance of Malaysian airline MH-370 in March 2014 and the 
sinking of the South Korean ferry in April 2014 led to the 
realization of the lack of effectiveness and efficiency of SAR 
coordination among the regional countries, as well as between the 
aeronautical and maritime elements of the national SAR structures. 
Notably, many countries are not parties to the SAR Convention 
1979. Another major void is the lack of SAR capacity of the regional 
countries, particularly in relation to the geographical extent of SAR 
regions allotted to them.  
Many regional countries have not even ratified the SAR 
Convention. Amongst the major reason is their sensitivities over 
the issue of sovereignty. This is closely linked to their 
apprehensions about the potential actions of the major extra-
regional powers.  This leads to the issue of geopolitics in the region. 
2.5 The Geopolitical Dimension 
As indicated earlier, many extra-regional powers are major 
stakeholders in the region and therefore have continued to play a 
dominant security role in the Indo-Pacific region. Their role is 
essentially premised either on meeting their alliance commitments 
or delivering public goods as part of their normative international 
obligations. The multilateral security forums in the region are 
amenable to such an ‗inclusive‘ approach to regional security for 
two good reasons: the need for regional countries to resort to 
hedging/strategic deterrence, and to tide over the capacity 
constraints of regional maritime forces. However, the involvement 
of external powers has its concomitant adversities in terms of 
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regional security and stability. Such adversities may manifest in the 
following forms: - 
Dominance- The preponderance of a single major power or a 
group of monolithic military allies is not desirable for the Indo-
Pacific region. An example is the establishment of the British 
military base in Bahrain, which was undeniably planned in consort 
with the US, whether the stated purpose was anti-piracy, anti-ISIS, 
or anti-China.  
Rivalry- The geopolitical rivalry among major powers, even if an 
adequate balance of power is achieved and maintained.  
3. Possible Adverse Scenarios 
 Politico-military interventions in response to political or socio-
economic instability in a regional country. It would be a race for 
being the first to intervene.  
 Intervention in other forms using a natural disaster or man-
made accident as an excuse. In 2008, during Cyclone Nargis, 
some Western countries invoked R2P in Myanmar. The intent 
may have been benign, but such actions clearly violate state 
sovereignty, which did not go down well with the smaller 
countries of the region. It is based on such risks that many 
regional countries have not acceded to the Search and Rescue 
(SAR) Convention, 1979.  
 Rival powers may assist smaller regional countries, such as in 
capacity-building, but such assistance is often accompanied 
with further conditions, and at times, create military imbalances 
in a particular sub-region or region. The Chinese arms sales to 
the littoral countries of the IOR is case in point. 
 Capacity building by major powers through the sale of defense 
hardware leads to regional polarisation. An unbridled and 
‗unqualified‘ capacity-building could lead to local instability or 
even the activation of maritime disputes.  
 The preventive measures by some countries affected by sea-
level rise may lead to a variety of unforeseen consequences, 
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possibly with grave geopolitical and strategic ramifications for 
the stakeholders in the area. A case in point is the Maldives, 
whose government passed national legislation in July 2015 
amending the national Constitution, which permits land 
reclamation by foreigners including China. Prior to the 
amendment, Article 251 of the Constitution prohibited 
foreign ownership of land. The amendment, however, permits 
land ownership by a foreign entity that invests more than the 
US $ 1 billion in a project provided ―at least 70 percent of the 
land must have been reclaimed from the ocean and visible at 
medium tide‖(Maldives Amends Constitution to Allow Sale of 
Islands to Foreign Nationals, 2015). 
4. Conclusion 
A few facts distinguishing the ‗sea‘ from the ‗land‘ need to be noted 
by national policy-makers and analysts to understand the regional 
maritime security dynamics and tailor appropriate responses for 
ensuring the nation‘s maritime security. Unlike the affairs on land, 
in the maritime realm, national security interests and objectives 
reach far beyond the nation‘s frontiers and its littoral, into areas of 
maritime interest. India‘s primary and secondary areas of maritime 
interest – as articulated in India‘s Maritime Security Strategy 
(Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015) – span the entire Indo-Pacific 
region. Also, unlike in the terrestrial domain, the non-traditional 
security threats to a nation‘s littoral and maritime interests often 
overlap with traditional military insecurities. Furthermore, unlike 
the non-traditional security issues within the land borders of 
countries, in the international medium of the seas, these security 
issues and the responses to them would invariably be accompanied 
by regional geopolitics. This could be in the form of regional 
countries and extra-regional stakeholders fulfilling their 
international commitments, or their actions driven by their own 
strategic interests and imperatives.  
The aforesaid indicates that the insecurities emanating in and from 
the maritime realm are indeed more complex than land-based 
internal security challenges. This reinforces the imperative for 
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synergy among the various national agencies and even 
commercial/private enterprises for effective national security 
response. This is particularly relevant for India, which needs to 
cover much ground in this regard. 
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